US Security Alliances with other Countries as non-proliferation actions- An assessment

Introduction

Lewis Dunn has suggested that 'U.S. security alliances with other countries...have been the most important non proliferation actions taken over the past five decades.' To be able to analyse the accuracy of Lewis Dunn’s statement it is first important to elucidate what ‘non proliferation actions’ mean to this paper. At face value, it could mean any action directed towards the objectives of the Non Proliferation Treaty which aims at restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This includes any measures, ‘initiatives or development widely acknowledged to strengthen efforts to decrease proliferation incentives, increase proliferation disincentives, assisting in the rollback of proliferation’[1] and to assist states without nuclear weapons to retain their peaceful status. Methods of working towards this are very region and case specific however the biggest non proliferations actions include compellence, bargaining chips like economic sanctions, security alliances and other counter proliferation[2] measures like the Proliferation Security Initiative. Furthermore each of these can have multiple objectives apart from disarmament alone.

This paper studies security alliances provided by the United States of America and assess its prominence in non proliferation actions pertaining to nuclear weapons, missiles and nuclear energy only. The essay will not study chemical and biological weapon proliferation. The paper is divided into four main parts- the first part introducing the concept of US security alliances. Second part explains this with two examples- South Korea and Taiwan. The third part focuses analyses the process by which these alliances become non proliferation actions. Finally, concluding assessments are made with regard to Lewis Dunn’s statement.

Security Alliances

‘Measures to improve security might include regional agreements that reduce the risk of war, and global security arrangements that reduce the chances of attack from outside the region.’[3] US security alliances are the best example of a single guarantor state providing security commitments to another state in order to discourage nuclear proliferation. ‘US policymakers have been willing to continue the cold war era bargain; if wash allies and clients renounce ambitions to acquire independent deterrents, the US will help protect their security.’[4] This means that if there is any attack on any US allies, it would be considered as an offensive first strike on the US and thus it can counter or defend all the allies with its weapons.

‘The security assurances that the US has made concerning its own behaviour have ranged from the soft (less explicit and/or binding) variety (extended, for example, to Ukraine) to bilateral and multilateral collective security arrangements (Australia, Japan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and South Korea), which often are reinforced by the presence of U.S. troops.’[5] The cases of South Korea and Taiwan are studies below as examples to explain this further.

South Korea

The US security alliances in the case of the Republic of Korea (ROK), have proved to be pivotal in not only preventing South Korean indigenous weapon programs but also by deterring its biggest enemy North Korea. After the Korean War in the 1950s South Korea was concerned over the status of its diminishing security and felt the need to have a nuclear posture as a deterrent and for tactical purposes. However, ‘the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) committed the United States to the defence of South Korea.’[6] In 1959, South Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) intending to plan its nuclear power industry and under the protection of the US, it saw no need or incentive to develop nuclear weapons. Mainly the security guarantee from a dominant USA and the presence of their forces on the South Korean soil paled the strategic requirement of ROK to have an independent nuclear capability. To prevent any development of armed conflicts between the north and south, the US stationed forces equipped with tactical nuclear and higher conventional weapons. This doubled as a deterrent to North Korea apart from being a security assurance for South Korea.

With the ongoing cold war and talks in the US about building self defence in South Korea, ‘Seoul created the Weapons Exploitation Committee in 1970, an organization designed for the covert development of modern weapons to bolster South Korea’s defences.’[7] This was then stopped after the US used the security assurance as a bargaining chip in return for South Korea to stop their nuclear weapons program. The US security alliances had carrots and sticks in their security assurances. With the entire security and deterrence position at stake, Seoul gave up nuclear weapons and joined the NPT.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s biggest threat was the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with its intimidating military superiority. In 1964, China tested a nuclear weapon sending warning signals to Taipei causing the latter to start a ‘secret nuclear weapons program which was later abandoned in 1976 with extensive US pressure.’[8] Taiwan had joined the non proliferation treaty in 1968 after having accepted the US security assurances which perhaps was the only hope for a small island like Taiwan to sustain against China. The signing of the ‘Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 was a major step security assurance for Taiwan.’[9] However, Taiwan did attempt to restart the nuclear program in 1987 – much after the signing of the TRA but the USA easily used the security alliance as a bargaining chip and terminated the nuclear research in Taiwan. In this case, a strong and credible security assurance was the only way that could keep Taiwan from proliferating nuclear weapons and this assurance could not have been provided by any other country but for America.

There have been instances where the US had to prove its credibility to both South Korea and Taiwan as tensions in the region grew or tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union would stem up. In addition around the early 1970s were worried if President Richard Nixon would undermine the security assurance as a result of his new relationship and later recognition of China. ROK would attempt to restart their nuclear weapon program but each time it would be coaxed by the security alliance bargain.

Security alliances as non proliferation actions

Nuclear Rollback- Nuclear rollback is a major step in the global non proliferation action and security guarantees under the US nuclear umbrella were determinants of many nuclear rollback cases. Cases of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Libya, Sweden, Switzerland and South Africa are important cases of rollback and as a common factor; the US security alliance has helped them all forgo their nuclear capabilities. The security alliances may not have been the complete reason bringing about nuclear rollback but have acted as the ‘threshold or the ‘’tipping point’’ where the cumulative events lead up to the point that makes nuclear rollback feasible.’[10] The vehemence of this threshold dynamic can be explained through the South Korea case. South Korea reconsidered their nuclear decision and toggled with their nuclear capability even after becoming an ally of the US. This was then put to an end after the US threatened to impose sanctions and retrieve forces from their soil. Regardless of whether Seoul wanted to carry out weapons program, they had to give up their nuclear program as the balance was tilting on the side of disarmament with the main weight on the scale being the US security guarantee.

Preventing Horizontal Proliferation- The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is a good example of how many European states found the security guarantee coming from the US sufficient and a valuable alternative to developing indigenous nuclear weapons in every state hereby reducing horizontal proliferation. In other words, it reduced the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons. This security guarantee and the power of extended deterrence lead to Sweden’s decision not to acquire nuclear weapon[11], Switzerland’s decision to refrain from building nuclrear weapons, Germany’s decision to give up nuclear weapons. ‘The U.S. security guarantee, coupled with the constraints on former Axis powers in the World War II settlements, has prevented the development of any post-World War II nuclear weapons program in many European, Asian, and Oceanic countries, including former adversaries and allies.’[12] Similarly, in North East Asia the US security alliances kept South Korea and Taiwan from developing their own functional nuclear arsenal which would have resulted in a huge arms race in the region. That said, it can be asserted that ‘if this equilibrium in the Korean peninsula were broken- for example by a withdrawal of US security commitment...then the attractiveness of the nuclear weapon option would again increase.’[13]

Security Alliances vs Economic Sanctions

Economic Sanctions are another important non proliferation action in context to nuclear rollback or reversal. The two methods can be compared to assess as to how important Security alliances have been. In retrospect, it does seem that security alliances have been more successful in achieving non proliferation goals mainly because security assurances come first for most states that have or perceive a threat. ‘Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that at least some states (presently North Korea, but previously also Italy, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan) may have deliberately moved ahead on the nuclear weapons path, by collecting information, conducting studies, procuring equipment, and constructing facilities, to attract or drive up the value of U.S. rewards offered to them in return for nuclear reversal.’[14] There are many doubts raised against US security alliances as non proliferation actions regarding their effectiveness. The US security alliances with Israel and South Korea have is believed to have worsened the situation with Iran and North Korea respectively by prompting them to increase their nuclear arsenal. This is said to have problematized global attempts to disarm the two countries. However, this does not become a downfall for security alliances as it has prevented escalation of crisis and horizontal proliferation in regional domains.

US security alliances were important non proliferation action in the past five decades but would not have been self sufficient. For instance, Lewis Dunn substantiates his statement with the example of the US-Libya relations being crucial in Libya’s rollback but it is required to add that the US-Libya relations may not have been possible without the role of the UK as a mediator. These alliances compliment other counter proliferation initiatives and non proliferation regimes. Most of the success is achieved with the alliances acting as a deterrent aiding in reducing conflicts in the specific region for instance, US weapons deployed in South Korea acted as a deterrent to North Korea. Curtailing regional conflicts is a big leap in curtailing a state’s need for a nuclear weapon which is what makes security and proliferation inversely propotional.

Concluding Assessments

Prior to making conclusions on this, it is important to stress again that the prominence of these security alliances can only be ascertained based on what the understanding of non proliferation ‘action’ is. For instance, non proliferation action also includes responsibilities of ensuring peaceful use of nuclear energy, actions of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which checks the transfer of nuclear material aiming to ensure peaceful use of nuclear energy and avoid illicit transfers. In which case, it can be debated that cases like the US-India alliance regarding nuclear energy co-operation is not complimenting non-proliferation action. However, having focused primarily on rollback and disarmament as non proliferation actions, it can be said that Lewis Dunn was right in stating that the US security alliances are the most important non proliferation actions in the past five decades.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carpenter, Galen Ted (1994) ‘Closing the Nuclear Umbrella’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, No.2, pp.8-13

Choung- II Chee, ‘Rethinking about South Korea’s Security in face of North Korea’s Nuclear Capability’ in Goldblat Jozef, ed (1985), ‘Non Proliferation: the Why and Wherefore.’ (London: Taylor and Francis for SIPRI), pp.197-205

Dunn, Lewis A.(2006) 'COUNTERING PROLIFERATION', The Nonproliferation Review, 13: 3, pp.479 – 489

Forsberg, Randall et al (1999), ‘Nonproliferaion Primer: Preventing the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons.’ (USA- MIT Press), pp.95- 112

Gill, Bates (1997) ‘Proliferation and the US Alliances in Northeast Asia’, (Shorenstein APARC), pp.1-11. Available at http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/proliferation_and_the_us_alliances_in_northeast_asia/

Hersman, Rebecca K.C, ‘Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback’, pp.539- 553. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/133hersman.pdf

Jacob, Neerada (2005), ‘The Nuclear Tipping Point: Towards a Theory of Nuclear Weapons Rollback’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, pp. 1-6. Available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/4/0/6/7/pages40671/p40671-1.php

Katz, J. I.(2008) 'Lessons Learned from Nonproliferation Successes and Failures', Comparative Strategy, 27: 5, 426 – 430

Levite, Ariel E (2002-2003) ‘Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited’, International Security, Vol.27, No.3, pp.59-88

Rosen, Stephen Peter, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Alliance Relations’, in Utgoff, Victor A, eds. (2000), ‘the Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S Interests, and World Order’, (BCSIA Studies in International Security), pp.125-156

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[1] Dunn, Lewis, p.481

[2] Counter proliferation here is looked at as non proliferation action too as the line between the two are blurry when it comes to their basic purpose.

[3] Forsberg Randall et al, p.109

[4] Carpenter Ted Galen, p.10

[5] Levite, Ariel, p.77

[6] Peters Robert, Hersman Rebecca K.C, p.540

[7] Ibid, p.541

[8] Levite, Ariel, p.81

[9] Peters Robert, Hersman Rebecca K.C, p.545

[10] Jacob, Neerada, p.2. The author uses the nuclear ‘threshold and tipping point’ dynamics to explain nuclear rollback. This paper applies the dynamics to the function of US security allies in order to explain the ways it could work.

[11] Dunn, Lewis, p.481

[12] J I Katz, 428

[13] Chee Choung II, p.210

[14] Levite, Ariel, p.80