Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Role of Oil in the Prolongation of Conflicts

Introduction

In most ways, war is a like a business- one where commerce makes manners harsh and in return, war brings money. Oil raises capital and when put together with corruption and political instability war can be highly profitable. Oil being a non-renewable resource that is vital in the times of rapid industrialization and development makes it worth fighting for and worth fighting dirty for. Oil as a resource could inculcate responses and interest from many foreign nations more easily than any other resource. The abundance of oil in a state and its high market value leads to conflicts of many kinds (going by the ‘resource curse’ theory). This paper studies the role oil has played in prolonging conflicts. Firstly, it explains how oil resource could affect the duration of a conflict. Secondly, the paper provides three main case studies namely of Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. In conclusion, the paper studies newer cases and the role of multinational oil corporations in prolonging conflicts.

Oil and duration of a conflict

It is important to understand the nature of oil that makes it more problematic in this context than other resources. There is a high demand for oil which means its ‘perceived importance’ is very high and is very profitable for the country that is abundant in oil fields. The relationship between oil and the duration of conflicts can be studied. To a large extent oil prolongs an existing conflict; Macartan Humphrey in the Journal of Conflict Resolution suggests different mechanisms that explain how natural resources can prolong conflicts. Here are some of the mechanisms that are relevant in terms of oil conflicts.

Firstly, there is the Feasibility Mechanism wherein natural resource revenue finances and helps procure weapons acting as an incentive for combatants to fight for longer. It is the economics logic that longer wars need more weapons and weapons need money so oil pumps in the money. This mechanism could explain the Angolan conflict wherein both groups (MLPA and the UNITA) had access to huge funds arising from natural resources.

The second is the Military Balances Mechanisms- apart from just resource revenues financing buying of weapons and saving combatants, it acts as an incentive to inflict harm on the opponent and in return helps sustain damages inflicted upon the self. Michael Ross (2002) suggests that “booty futures” financing—financing to secure assets that can be gained after a war ends—can be associated with longer wars.[1] This is especially true when there is corruption in domestic politics together with a high inflow of oil revenues.

The third is Fragmented Organizational Structures Mechanism that suggests that organizational hierarchy, size and cohesion affects duration of conflict. To justify this, oil is a resource that could be a clear example as it requires more cohesion in its management and extraction than other resources like cattle or water. ‘Resource wealth can prolong conflict by weakening the prospects for third-party peace mediation.’[2]

There have been many studies proving that wars are longer in countries that are abundant in oil wealth and are less dependent on oil themselves. In addition, the role of the state, warlords and rebels play a key role- ‘conflict can create war economies, often in the regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members of armed gangs can benefit from looting; and regimes can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters and maintain their access to resources. Under these circumstances, ending civil wars becomes difficult.’[3] Finally, the role of bunkering in the areas of conflict can affect the duration by avoiding peace measures.

Angola

Mineral wealth in Angola has not only been a source of finance for the war but has also clearly shaped the conflict itself. Oil has played a major role in the Civil war that the country faced from 1975 to 2002. Most of the developmental activities in Angola happened mainly around the oil resource. The discovery of offshore oil resources created a huge interest from foreign companies like Chevron. Angola seized the opportunity well understanding the fact that it was a good source of profit.

New oil discoveries in the 1990s lead to many new companies seeking for a share. ‘This was best demonstrated by the award of the ultra deepwater oil blocks 31-33 in 1999, which will be operated by BP, TotalFinaElf and Exxon-Mobil. Despite only limited seismic information being available, the foreign oil companies were prepared to pay over US$900 million in 'signature bonuses' - down payments for the exclusive right to explore for and produce oil in the delineated areas - for the blocks.’[4] This was also after the fall of the Soviet Union that was formerly of great military assistance to Angola after which the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had to fund all the arms in cash after winning the election in 1992. The MPLA and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were the chief antagonists of the war. It is evident here that without the revenues from oil, the Angolan government would have faced serious difficulty in continuing to fight the war in the absence of the foreign powers.

‘The activities of foreign oil companies have affected the shape of the conflict; the intense competition for oil concessions has led to a number of different companies seeking the favour of the Angolan state elite through dubious charitable donations, weapons deals, and other forms of assistance.’[5] The MPLA government used the revenues from the oil to procure weapons in large quantities- from small conventional arms like guns and light artilleries to expensive jet aircrafts and tanks. Weapons as a result of oil trade were brought in from Russia, Portugal, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria and South Africa.[6] These weapons were mainly used to fight even if not defeat the UNITA rebels. On the other hand UNITA controlled most of the diamond deposits and hence were able to sustain a good fight against the MPLA. It must be remembered that the war originated out of political issues but its progress, timing and duration was purely determined by the oil revenues and its fluctuations.

Angola also learnt that such conditions of war could provide huge business opportunities to specific interest groups and under such conditions with heavy cash inflosw; the money could also go into the pockets of government officials. The war empowered the Angolan Armed Forces and allowed many senior officers to own private security companies as a private business. ‘One stark example of the link between the war and the government beneficiaries was the British Virgin Island registered CADA (Companhia Angolana de Distribuicao Alimentar). CADA has reportedly been awarded a US$720 million five-year contract to feed Angola's armed forces in 1999. Dos Santos reportedly obtained control over CADA just before the resumption of war in December 1998. As Global Witness (1999) pointed out, the more the army consumes, the more those who are associated with companies such as CADA can profit.’[7] These groups benefiting from the revenues during the conflict clearly prefer to fight than to come to peace terms.

As described earlier, this is also an example to show oil prolongs conflict by becoming uncompromising and deviated from peace moves. There have been several failed peace talks between the two groups. Infact, even the UNSC in 1993 laid restrictions on the availability of oil and arms to the UNITA also monitoring their diamond export. However, this was unsuccessful for two main reasons- a) the diamond market is very complex and difficult to keep track of illegal trades and b) the UNITA was forced to develop weapons as the MPLA were spending more and more on weapons- this acted as a catalyst for weaponization on both sides.

Sudan

War and conflict have dominated much of Sudan for the past few decades with the 23-year old Sudanese Civil War being the longest military conflict ever in Africa. The massive discovery and interest in oil in the late 1970s (first by Chevron in 1979) truly changed the socio-political and the military outlook in Sudan. In 1983, foreign oil companies formed the White Nile Petroleum Company with an aim to build pipelines to the port on the Red Sea. In the same year there were severe conflicts between the north and south of Sudan as a result of the Sharia Law and local non Arab tribes in the south started the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Once the condition worsened Chevron was forced to leave selling their stakes to Sudanese companies.

These oil sources are mainly located in southern Sudan and the fight for the control of these reserves was one of the main aims of the rebellion by the SPLA. With more foreign investments being directed towards Sudan’s oil, they realised the value of the resource and acknowledged the fact that it is worth fighting for and gaining control over.

Like in Angola, the Sudanese government has used the revenues generated from oil to finance enormous arms purchases mainly from China. ‘Weapons deliveries from China to Sudan since 1995 have included ammunition, tanks, helicopters, and fighter aircraft. China also became a major supplier of antipersonnel and antitank mines after 1980.’[8] This demarcates the vicious cycle of oil revenues being used to proliferate which in response becomes an incentive to fight for longer dimming the light of peace.

There Sudanese government in Khartoum evidently needs to depend on the south as the main oil producing areas are located there. Even till recently, for South Sudan (Juba), oil represented 98 percent of total revenues for the year compared to Khartoum at 65 percent.[9] The more discoveries of oil in the south are an indicator that the north will continue fights against the SPLA. ‘The recent discovery of a possible 12.5 billion barrels in the South of the country further implies that the stakes in the war are getting higher, and that the north will continue to fight to ensure the ensure of what is likely to be one of the world’s largest oil fields.’[10]

Another facet of the story to mention is the fact that Sudan had a huge concern of militant security including that of China who was a main provider of weapons. ‘A report issued by Christian Aid, an international development agency, said: "Military protection is also part of the partnership. As in many conflict-ridden countries, the oil companies are themselves targets. The SPLA has declared oilfields and oil companies to be legitimate military targets...’[11]

In 2005, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed which provided for an equal share of oil and revenues between the two regions. Despite of this, there have been clashes between the Khartoum and the SPLA. In addition, the ongoing violence in Darfur shows that there is continuous source of weapons with no motives of moving towards a peace negotiation though millions of are at stake in Darfur.

Sudan is a clear example of a state rich in natural resources that is tied down to war and devastation. High incomes from oil resources have done little or no efforts to improve quality of life. In the absence of oil resources, would Sudan have been able to remain at war for so long? Could they have found a peace negotiation earlier?

Nigeria

Nigeria has held the reputation of being the first and technically the largest single oil-producing country in the world. This very reason has enabled Nigeria to attain a hegemonic dominant status in West Africa. Nigeria has purchased massive stocks of weapons with the proceeds of oil resources including combat aircrafts, armoured vessels, military tanks etc. This however was done more to sidetrack the money into the defence and military needs so the officers could pocket it. Corruption is a huge culprit that allows for a total misuse of revenues and that seeks to impose further damage upon other states.

Nigeria cunningly makes use of the proceeds from oil in sustaining a control or impact or an external actor/state that does not have access to oil. A good example of this is Nigeria’s involvement in Liberia- ‘it is possible that individual Nigerian soldiers might have deliberately prolonged the Liberian war to make more money from the oil allocation being made by the Nigerian government to assist in bringing about durable peace.’[12] This issue has come to light many times also leading to Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with regard to keeping the interests of Nigeria at the forefront even if it meant sabotaging the peace process within Liberia.

Another important aspect stemming out of corruption and oil revenues is illegal bunkering which is seen in the case of Nigeria and the Niger delta. The Niger delta has been a strategic component of Nigeria’s activities. Nigeria’s prolonged military rule has been blamed for the violence in the Niger like kidnapping, sabotage, seizure of oil facilities and heavy loss of life and property. The local tribes like Urhobo, Ijaw and the Itsekiri have also fought over the natural resource in the area and in 2004, mainly the Ijaw tribe formed the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) that fought with arms to gain control over the oil resources. Nigeria has been using the conflicts and instabilities in the Niger Delta to maximise their revenues through illegal bunkering- the old principle that two men fighting could be the third man’s win. A specialist on the Nigeria, Anthony Goldman, said the scale of attacks and the vast quantities of oil being siphoned confirms that senior Nigerian officials have protected and backed the armed militia that operate in the Niger delta.[13] The extent of this issue could be further substantiated with the incident where three naval officers were court-marshalled for the disappearance of a Russian ship which was previously detained for bunkering.[14]

Newer cases

Through this paper the issue has been exemplified in context to Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. The role of oil in prolonging conflicts can also be seen in Chadian politics where oil plays an important role ever since the President Tombalbaye was killed in 1975. The role of oil in prolonging conflicts is not something that is unique to Africa alone- it is present in other parts of the world as well but may not be in sure brutal forms. Another good example to study is the case of Venezuela. In 1975, Venezuela took control of the oil industries. It is the sixth largest oil producing nation in the world and managing resources have always been a problem. There have been constant riots within the nation and with the US regarding the pricing of oil (which closely determines 80% exports and over one third of the country’s GDP).[15] The constant interference of the US ignited the main conflict in 2002 when the US supported the opposition and played a role in overthrowing president Chavez.

Venezuela is using funds from the oil market to help get back against rival states like US and Colombia. The recent deal between Venezuela and Russia gives an insight to how this conflict now has the potential to breakout into a civil war. A 30 billion dollar investment from Russia and trade in arms including military tanks is the demand from President Hugo Chavez. In return, Russia gets access to Venezuela’s estimated 53 billion barrel oil fields.[16] This quid pro quo deal is intended to make Venezuela’s military ability stronger in response to the United States’ vast military presence in Columbia. This brings to light how a purely political conflict is being prolonged because Venezuela now has the funds that its oil has to offer.

Role of Multi-National Corporations

The presence of multinational oil corporations worsens the situation in two ways- a) they provide incentives to the state for reciprocal gains in oil trade b) they hinder peace negotiations directly or indirectly. MNC’S play a role in increasing corruption and further de-stabilizing a state by having different agreement of profit share with the governments of the oil producing state. MNC’s and foreign actors lack transparency in their activities and are often exploit states for their selfish gains including practising illegal trading, bribing and aided in deregulating markets for their own survival which results in the warring states finding easier ways to make money (like Nigeria and bunkering).

Concluding Assessment

In all the cases studied in this paper, it is evident that the ultimate sufferers are the people with surplus revenues coming in through oil and yet almost nothing is directed towards prospering development or living conditions of the people. It is not even ironic that countries like Angola, Nigeria and Sudan are among the poorest and most devastated nations in the world. This in its own way these countries justify the ‘resource curse’ theory which suggests that slow economic growth, corruption, authoritarian rule and unstable domestic politics are proportional to the abundance of natural resources.

Having said this, it cannot be generalized that not all oil producing nations go through the same kind of conflicts. Circumstances of instability can also reduce the duration of conflict by bringing the parties to an agreement of peace and sharing or by putting the protagonists in a stalemate situation. More than relating these issues to the resource itself, the nature of the state must be considered. Similarly, it would be difficult to hypothesise if good governance of oil would have shortened wars- the political situation, policy and context is a clincher.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alao, Abiodun (2007), Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: the Tragedy of Endowment (University of Rochester Press), pp.160-190s

‘China’s Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil’, Available at- http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/26.htm, 4 January 2010

Frynas, Jedrzej George and Wood, Geoffrey (2001) 'Oil & war in Angola', Review of African Political Economy, 28: 90, pp.587- 606

Humphreys, Macartan (2005), ‘Natural Resource, Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms’ in Journal of Conflict Resolution 49; 508-537, p.1-12

Ian Bonnan and Paul Collier,eds (2003), Natural Resource and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (Washington DC: World Bank)

‘Nigerian Oil fuels Delta Conflict’, BBC News, 25 January 2006. Available at- http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4617658.stm

‘Oil, Arms and Violence in Africa’, http://www.concernedafricascholars.org/military/oilandarms.pdf, (5 January 2010)

‘Oil Fuelling Sudan Tensions’, Al Jazeera, 9 January 2008, available at- http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/01/2008525173125124943.html

Samset, Ingrid, ‘Natural Resource Wealth, Conflict, and Peacebuilding’, Available at- http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3283-natural-resource-wealth-conflict.pdf.

‘State Rules: Oil Companies and Armed Conflict in Sudan’, Third World Quarterly, 18 July 2007. Available at- http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/39773.html

‘The War in Angola’, http://www.raceandhistory.com/cgi-bin/forum/webbbs_config.pl/noframes/read/534, 3 January 2010

‘United Nations Mission in the Sudan- Background’, Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml, 4 January 2010

‘U.S Energy Information Administration: Independent Statistics and Analysis’, Available at- http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sudan/Background.html, (3 January 2010)

‘Venezuela’, http://www.flashpoints.info/countries-conflicts/countries-conflicts.html, (3 January 2010)

Volman, Daniel (2003), ‘Oil, Arms and Violence in Africe’, Available at- http://www.concernedafricascholars.org/military/oilandarms.pdf, 2 January 2010



[1] Humphreys,Macartan (2005), p.514

[2] Collier and Bannon (), p.218

[3] Samset, Ingrid, p.6

[4] Frynas and Wood (2001), p.6

[5] Frynas and Wood (2001),p.2

[6] ‘The War in Angola’ (2002)

[7] Frynas and Wood (2001), p.12

[8] ‘China’s Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil’, (2003)

[9] U.S Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sudan/Background.html

[10] Alao, Abiodun (2007), p.181

[11] ‘Oil Fuelling Sudan’s Tensions’. Al Jazeera, 9 January 2008

[12] Alao, Abiodun (2007), p.183

[13] ‘Nigerian Oil Fuels Delta Conflict’, BBC News, 25 January 2006

[14] Alao, Abiodun (2007), p.183

[16] ‘Russia and Venezuela: Deal in oil and arms’, Net Green News, 20 August 2009

US Security Alliances with other Countries as non-proliferation actions- An assessment

Introduction

Lewis Dunn has suggested that 'U.S. security alliances with other countries...have been the most important non proliferation actions taken over the past five decades.' To be able to analyse the accuracy of Lewis Dunn’s statement it is first important to elucidate what ‘non proliferation actions’ mean to this paper. At face value, it could mean any action directed towards the objectives of the Non Proliferation Treaty which aims at restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This includes any measures, ‘initiatives or development widely acknowledged to strengthen efforts to decrease proliferation incentives, increase proliferation disincentives, assisting in the rollback of proliferation’[1] and to assist states without nuclear weapons to retain their peaceful status. Methods of working towards this are very region and case specific however the biggest non proliferations actions include compellence, bargaining chips like economic sanctions, security alliances and other counter proliferation[2] measures like the Proliferation Security Initiative. Furthermore each of these can have multiple objectives apart from disarmament alone.

This paper studies security alliances provided by the United States of America and assess its prominence in non proliferation actions pertaining to nuclear weapons, missiles and nuclear energy only. The essay will not study chemical and biological weapon proliferation. The paper is divided into four main parts- the first part introducing the concept of US security alliances. Second part explains this with two examples- South Korea and Taiwan. The third part focuses analyses the process by which these alliances become non proliferation actions. Finally, concluding assessments are made with regard to Lewis Dunn’s statement.

Security Alliances

‘Measures to improve security might include regional agreements that reduce the risk of war, and global security arrangements that reduce the chances of attack from outside the region.’[3] US security alliances are the best example of a single guarantor state providing security commitments to another state in order to discourage nuclear proliferation. ‘US policymakers have been willing to continue the cold war era bargain; if wash allies and clients renounce ambitions to acquire independent deterrents, the US will help protect their security.’[4] This means that if there is any attack on any US allies, it would be considered as an offensive first strike on the US and thus it can counter or defend all the allies with its weapons.

The security assurances that the US has made concerning its own behaviour have ranged from the soft (less explicit and/or binding) variety (extended, for example, to Ukraine) to bilateral and multilateral collective security arrangements (Australia, Japan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and South Korea), which often are reinforced by the presence of U.S. troops.’[5] The cases of South Korea and Taiwan are studies below as examples to explain this further.

South Korea

The US security alliances in the case of the Republic of Korea (ROK), have proved to be pivotal in not only preventing South Korean indigenous weapon programs but also by deterring its biggest enemy North Korea. After the Korean War in the 1950s South Korea was concerned over the status of its diminishing security and felt the need to have a nuclear posture as a deterrent and for tactical purposes. However, ‘the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) committed the United States to the defence of South Korea.’[6] In 1959, South Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) intending to plan its nuclear power industry and under the protection of the US, it saw no need or incentive to develop nuclear weapons. Mainly the security guarantee from a dominant USA and the presence of their forces on the South Korean soil paled the strategic requirement of ROK to have an independent nuclear capability. To prevent any development of armed conflicts between the north and south, the US stationed forces equipped with tactical nuclear and higher conventional weapons. This doubled as a deterrent to North Korea apart from being a security assurance for South Korea.

With the ongoing cold war and talks in the US about building self defence in South Korea, ‘Seoul created the Weapons Exploitation Committee in 1970, an organization designed for the covert development of modern weapons to bolster South Korea’s defences.’[7] This was then stopped after the US used the security assurance as a bargaining chip in return for South Korea to stop their nuclear weapons program. The US security alliances had carrots and sticks in their security assurances. With the entire security and deterrence position at stake, Seoul gave up nuclear weapons and joined the NPT.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s biggest threat was the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with its intimidating military superiority. In 1964, China tested a nuclear weapon sending warning signals to Taipei causing the latter to start a ‘secret nuclear weapons program which was later abandoned in 1976 with extensive US pressure.’[8] Taiwan had joined the non proliferation treaty in 1968 after having accepted the US security assurances which perhaps was the only hope for a small island like Taiwan to sustain against China. The signing of the ‘Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 was a major step security assurance for Taiwan.’[9] However, Taiwan did attempt to restart the nuclear program in 1987 – much after the signing of the TRA but the USA easily used the security alliance as a bargaining chip and terminated the nuclear research in Taiwan. In this case, a strong and credible security assurance was the only way that could keep Taiwan from proliferating nuclear weapons and this assurance could not have been provided by any other country but for America.

There have been instances where the US had to prove its credibility to both South Korea and Taiwan as tensions in the region grew or tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union would stem up. In addition around the early 1970s were worried if President Richard Nixon would undermine the security assurance as a result of his new relationship and later recognition of China. ROK would attempt to restart their nuclear weapon program but each time it would be coaxed by the security alliance bargain.

Security alliances as non proliferation actions

Nuclear Rollback- Nuclear rollback is a major step in the global non proliferation action and security guarantees under the US nuclear umbrella were determinants of many nuclear rollback cases. Cases of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Libya, Sweden, Switzerland and South Africa are important cases of rollback and as a common factor; the US security alliance has helped them all forgo their nuclear capabilities. The security alliances may not have been the complete reason bringing about nuclear rollback but have acted as the ‘threshold or the ‘’tipping point’’ where the cumulative events lead up to the point that makes nuclear rollback feasible.’[10] The vehemence of this threshold dynamic can be explained through the South Korea case. South Korea reconsidered their nuclear decision and toggled with their nuclear capability even after becoming an ally of the US. This was then put to an end after the US threatened to impose sanctions and retrieve forces from their soil. Regardless of whether Seoul wanted to carry out weapons program, they had to give up their nuclear program as the balance was tilting on the side of disarmament with the main weight on the scale being the US security guarantee.

Preventing Horizontal Proliferation- The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is a good example of how many European states found the security guarantee coming from the US sufficient and a valuable alternative to developing indigenous nuclear weapons in every state hereby reducing horizontal proliferation. In other words, it reduced the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons. This security guarantee and the power of extended deterrence lead to Sweden’s decision not to acquire nuclear weapon[11], Switzerland’s decision to refrain from building nuclrear weapons, Germany’s decision to give up nuclear weapons.The U.S. security guarantee, coupled with the constraints on former Axis powers in the World War II settlements, has prevented the development of any post-World War II nuclear weapons program in many European, Asian, and Oceanic countries, including former adversaries and allies.’[12] Similarly, in North East Asia the US security alliances kept South Korea and Taiwan from developing their own functional nuclear arsenal which would have resulted in a huge arms race in the region. That said, it can be asserted that ‘if this equilibrium in the Korean peninsula were broken- for example by a withdrawal of US security commitment...then the attractiveness of the nuclear weapon option would again increase.’[13]

Security Alliances vs Economic Sanctions

Economic Sanctions are another important non proliferation action in context to nuclear rollback or reversal. The two methods can be compared to assess as to how important Security alliances have been. In retrospect, it does seem that security alliances have been more successful in achieving non proliferation goals mainly because security assurances come first for most states that have or perceive a threat. ‘Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that at least some states (presently North Korea, but previously also Italy, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan) may have deliberately moved ahead on the nuclear weapons path, by collecting information, conducting studies, procuring equipment, and constructing facilities, to attract or drive up the value of U.S. rewards offered to them in return for nuclear reversal.’[14] There are many doubts raised against US security alliances as non proliferation actions regarding their effectiveness. The US security alliances with Israel and South Korea have is believed to have worsened the situation with Iran and North Korea respectively by prompting them to increase their nuclear arsenal. This is said to have problematized global attempts to disarm the two countries. However, this does not become a downfall for security alliances as it has prevented escalation of crisis and horizontal proliferation in regional domains.

US security alliances were important non proliferation action in the past five decades but would not have been self sufficient. For instance, Lewis Dunn substantiates his statement with the example of the US-Libya relations being crucial in Libya’s rollback but it is required to add that the US-Libya relations may not have been possible without the role of the UK as a mediator. These alliances compliment other counter proliferation initiatives and non proliferation regimes. Most of the success is achieved with the alliances acting as a deterrent aiding in reducing conflicts in the specific region for instance, US weapons deployed in South Korea acted as a deterrent to North Korea. Curtailing regional conflicts is a big leap in curtailing a state’s need for a nuclear weapon which is what makes security and proliferation inversely propotional.

Concluding Assessments

Prior to making conclusions on this, it is important to stress again that the prominence of these security alliances can only be ascertained based on what the understanding of non proliferation ‘action’ is. For instance, non proliferation action also includes responsibilities of ensuring peaceful use of nuclear energy, actions of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which checks the transfer of nuclear material aiming to ensure peaceful use of nuclear energy and avoid illicit transfers. In which case, it can be debated that cases like the US-India alliance regarding nuclear energy co-operation is not complimenting non-proliferation action. However, having focused primarily on rollback and disarmament as non proliferation actions, it can be said that Lewis Dunn was right in stating that the US security alliances are the most important non proliferation actions in the past five decades.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carpenter, Galen Ted (1994) ‘Closing the Nuclear Umbrella’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, No.2, pp.8-13

Choung- II Chee, ‘Rethinking about South Korea’s Security in face of North Korea’s Nuclear Capability’ in Goldblat Jozef, ed (1985), ‘Non Proliferation: the Why and Wherefore.’ (London: Taylor and Francis for SIPRI), pp.197-205

Dunn, Lewis A.(2006) 'COUNTERING PROLIFERATION', The Nonproliferation Review, 13: 3, pp.479 – 489

Forsberg, Randall et al (1999), ‘Nonproliferaion Primer: Preventing the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons.’ (USA- MIT Press), pp.95- 112

Gill, Bates (1997) ‘Proliferation and the US Alliances in Northeast Asia’, (Shorenstein APARC), pp.1-11. Available at http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/proliferation_and_the_us_alliances_in_northeast_asia/

Hersman, Rebecca K.C, ‘Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback’, pp.539- 553. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/133hersman.pdf

Jacob, Neerada (2005), ‘The Nuclear Tipping Point: Towards a Theory of Nuclear Weapons Rollback’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, pp. 1-6. Available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/4/0/6/7/pages40671/p40671-1.php

Katz, J. I.(2008) 'Lessons Learned from Nonproliferation Successes and Failures', Comparative Strategy, 27: 5, 426 – 430

Levite, Ariel E (2002-2003) ‘Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited’, International Security, Vol.27, No.3, pp.59-88

Rosen, Stephen Peter, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Alliance Relations’, in Utgoff, Victor A, eds. (2000), ‘the Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S Interests, and World Order’, (BCSIA Studies in International Security), pp.125-156



[1] Dunn, Lewis, p.481

[2] Counter proliferation here is looked at as non proliferation action too as the line between the two are blurry when it comes to their basic purpose.

[3] Forsberg Randall et al, p.109

[4] Carpenter Ted Galen, p.10

[5] Levite, Ariel, p.77

[6] Peters Robert, Hersman Rebecca K.C, p.540

[7] Ibid, p.541

[8] Levite, Ariel, p.81

[9] Peters Robert, Hersman Rebecca K.C, p.545

[10] Jacob, Neerada, p.2. The author uses the nuclear ‘threshold and tipping point’ dynamics to explain nuclear rollback. This paper applies the dynamics to the function of US security allies in order to explain the ways it could work.

[11] Dunn, Lewis, p.481

[12] J I Katz, 428

[13] Chee Choung II, p.210

[14] Levite, Ariel, p.80